When Sickles finally proved to be a thorn in the side of the Confederacy, General Lee had to change his plans.  Sending out some of the men from Hood’s division, reconnaissance was made and Hood himself reported back:  “Although Sickles’ line was irregularly shaped, what captivated Hood’s interest most was what his scouts had to say about the terrain features in his front and what lay beyond the Round Tops….Strewn with rock outcroppings and heavily timbered, it rose to a height of about 270 feet above the valley floor.”[1]  Long after information about the enemy’s position was verified, Longstreet was expected to attack but found himself delaying in hopes that Lee would change his mind:
                “At the opening of the fight, General Mead was with General Sickles discussing the feasibility of moving the Third Corps back to the line originally assigned for it, but the discussion was cut short by the opening of the Confederate battle.  If that opening had been delayed thirty or forty minutes the corps would have been drawn back to the general line, and my first deployment would have enveloped Little Round Top and carried it before it could have been strongly manned.”[2]
               Longstreet states his grievances with the attack on the second day in his memoirs but many historians find them to be unreliable because of his own bias and attempt to clear his name.  Edward Porter Alexander blames Lee for allowing the delays to take place and states that an earlier attack on the Round Tops would have ensured victory, writing,  “But it seems to me that while he might blame himself for it, general criticism must be modified by the fact that Gen. Lee’s granting the request justified it as apparently prudent, at the time.”[3]  Others may say that a general asking for a delay for the well-being of his own troops is the sign of a caring commander, but Longstreet was against this from the beginning.  If anything, on the second day of battle, he was delaying in hopes that Lee would change his mind; but what was going on with Ewell at this point was a completely different situation than what he was in on the first day.
              The largest fear of the Confederate Second Corps was whether or not the Union was digging in on Culp’s Hill and if they were, how well were they digging?  They “…were turning their positions into even more defensible ones.  They hacked at trees, gathered pieces of cordwood, rolled rocks around, and shoveled dirt, constructing the most formidable breast-works on the field at Gettysburg.”[4]  Wadsworth’s shattered division, including the Iron Brigade, was facing the north of the hill with much of the Eleventh Corps facing the eastern side of the hill against the enemy.  The Eleventh Corps had replaced the Twelfth Corps early on the evening, which was a great mistake for the Union as the men from the Eleventh had been heavily engaged on the first day of battle.  “Yet the removal of most of the 12th Corps from Culp’s Hill during the early evening has been called a more serious error,”[5] than Sickles’ Salient.  But what was even more dangerous to the whole situation, especially the Confederacy, was that Ewell did not begin his infantry attacks until 7 p.m.  What was strange was that Ewell was supposed to begin his attack as soon as Longstreet’s guns could be heard, but what ensued was a fight in between the artillery:  “Instead of making a quick assault – which would have complied with Lee’s orders and held the Federal infantry in place – he undertook a sustained bombardment, allowed the Federal infantry to avoid him, and ended with most of his artillery silenced and his gun crews crippled.”[6]  While Joshua Lawrence Chamberlain was holding the south of the line, General George S. Greene held the north of the line at Culp’s Hill.    He was the general responsible for the building of entrenchment and the fight in this area:  “For three hours that night, the fate of the battle and possibly the destiny of the Federal cause hung on the staunch shoulders of “Old Pop” Greene, whose sturdiness had much to do with saving the hill for the Federals when its loss would have been calamitous.”[7]  Had George Greene not been there, the hill may not have been held and the Federal cause been lost.  But had Ewell taken the hill on the first day, we would have never heard the words “if practicable” in the reports of these generals.  The second day of battle had been a difficult one for both sides and there were heavy leadership losses to the Confederate army including the wounding of J.B. Hood and the mortal wounding of William Barksdale.  But one thing remained certain amidst all the casualties, there would be a fight the next day.
              Ewell knew that he would have to attempt to take the position on Culp’s Hill on the third day but he would need help after all of the casualties from the second day.  He gained the men of Rodes’ division which was engaged at the Oak Ridge of the first day of battle; they were also part of the third corps.  General Early, who was also present on the first day’s fight, was used to reinforce Ewell’s position.  As far as the Union position goes, the only remaining brigade from the Twelfth Corps, which vacated the previous day to be replaced by the Eleventh Corps, was Greene’s brigade and Williams’ brigade and they had no intention of leaving.  “The battle for Culp’s Hill resumed about 4:30 a.m. when Federal artillery opened on the Confederate positions…this was the first of the three phases of the fight on Culp’s Hill during July 3.”[8]  The Federal position was well fortified from the previous days and even after all of the fighting on the second, they were full with ammunition; that would be their downfall later on in the morning.  “Brigadier General George Greene’s men fired so rapidly their guns became fouled and their ammunition ran low.”[9]  Thankfully, General Williams from the Twelfth Corps rotated the line and placed his men in front; Greene’s men rested and resupplied.  But even resting was slim during this engagement.  “Federal fire was incessant.  One soldier from the 1st Maryland Battalion (CSA) recalled it this way: ‘The whole hillside seemed enveloped in a blaze.’”[10]  Ewell’s men moved in very odd fashions and the divisions brought to him to reinforce seemed to do more harm than good.  It seemed as though Rodes’ men moved very little during this day’s engagement but were engaged with the enemy firing up the hill.  It was not long in the day until Ewell pulled his men back from their attacking position and the firing slowed to a close, never finishing completely until the battle’s completion.  Longstreet praises Ewell for his lack of following orders, at least in the terms “if practicable” mean, by claiming his insubordination to be just against Lee to take Culp’s Hill on the first day.

              “It is the custom of military service to accept instructions of a commander as orders, but when they are coupled with conditions that transfer the responsibility of battle and defeat to the subordinate, they are not orders, and General Ewell was justifiable in not making attack that his commander would not order ,and the censure of his failure is unjust and very ungenerous.”[11] 
              It is very unique in this age that another commander, amidst endless blame, would praise another that had completely failed in his objective which speaks volumes about Longstreet’s character.
              Though Longstreet states that Ewell did the right thing by not attacking Culp’s Hill on the first of July, there is much blame that is not placed on Ewell that is placed on Longstreet.  Throughout the entire campaign, the general that performs in the worst sense of the word is J.E.B. Stuart who as the eyes and ears of the army, failed to provide Lee with information about the battlefield by arriving late on the second day of battle.  Longstreet delays his attacks on the second day of battle which is hindering to the strategy but Ewell’s operation at Culp’s Hill is damaging to say the least.  If the hill had been taken while there was no Federal presence on there would have drastically changed the face of the battle and maybe even the war.  At the time of the war, it would have been dangerous to blame Lee for the failures at Gettysburg even though Lee tried to resign after the campaign.  As the reports began to come into the war department, many of the commanders and soldiers pointed their fingers at Longstreet who openly stated that he did not desire to attack the position.  As the assault on the third of July with Pickett, Pettigrew, and Trimble’s division seemed grand on a Napoleonic scale and the devastating battles on the previous day, Culp’s Hill seemed less important than the rest of the battle and to this day, Ewell’s operations seem to be ignored.   As it seems today, the terms that Lee had given Ewell on that first day would haunt him for the rest of his life and would constantly lead everyone to believe what would have happened if they had taken the hill on the first day.  The two words “if practicable” ruined the Confederacy and Ewell’s reputation. 
              As the Army of Northern Virginia began their retreat back across the Potomac, General Lee had a strange encounter.  There was a soldier, a strong anti-Confederate soldier, who was wounded during the battle and lay by the street.  As Lee rode by him ordering his generals into retreat, he recognized him and he raised his head stretching out his arm saying “Hurrah for the Union!”  Lee dismounted Traveler and looked at the man with a grave look of defeat; as if his whole military career had come crashing down but tended to the boy with care.  He extended his hand and grasped his firmly.  “My son, I hope you will soon be well,” Lee replied.  He had been brought down by this campaign as all of the Confederacy had; the last thing he had on his mind at the time was who to place the blame. 

[1] Bowden, Scott and Ward, Bill.  “Last Chance for Victory: Robert E. Lee and the Gettysburg Campaign.”  Pg. 262.
[2] Longstreet, James.  “From Manassas to Appomattox.”  Pg. 382.
[3] Alexander, Edward Porter.  “Fighting for the Confederacy: The Personal Recollections of General Edward Porter Alexander.”  Pg. 278.
[4] Hall, Jeffery C.  “The Stand:  The U.S. Army at Gettysburg.”  Pg. 149.
[5] Ibid.  Pg. 152.
[6] Tucker, Glenn.  “High Tide at Gettysburg.”  Pg. 301.
[7] Ibid.  Pg. 302.
[8] Gottfried, Bradley M.  “The Maps of Gettysburg: An Atlas of the Gettysburg Campaign, June 3 – July 13, 1863.”  Pg. 242.
[9] Ibid.  Pg. 244.
[10] Ibid.  Pg. 244. 
[11] Longstreet, James.  “From Manassas to Appomattox.”  Pg. 381.

            James Longstreet however, was one of the more trusted commanders of the army at the time.  Longstreet “…was the dean of the Southern corps commanders at Gettysburg…had been in corps command twice as long as anybody else on either side, and it was he who would command the Army of Northern Virginia if Gen. Robert E. Lee became incapacitated.”[1]  He had seen a great amount of action throughout his military career and had fought through the entirety of the war.  One of his greatest feats was the action at Fredericksburg when, in a well dug in position, he mowed down the charging Federals against Mayre’s Heights.  But unlike Ewell, Longstreet had personality conflicts with Jackson which was one of the reasons he was absent from the Chancellorsville Campaign.  Before Lee invaded Pennsylvania, he knew he would need his “old war horse” by his side.  During the months of April to July of 1863, Lt. Col. Arthur J. Fremantle of Her Majesty’s Coldstream Guards toured the Confederate states and praised Longstreet’s character:  “A thickset, determined-looking man, forty-three years of age.  He was an infantry major in the old army and now commands the 1st corps d’armee.  He is never far from General Lee, who relies very much upon his judgment.  By the soldiers he is invariably spoken of as the ‘best fighter in the whole army.’”[2]
              Longstreet could easily see the issues of the proposed tactics as soon as Lee spoke them.  He saw Gettysburg as a reversed version of Fredericksburg where instead of his men being well dug in, it was the Federals.  The only thing he would need to turn the tide would be Big Round Top. Lee had wondered if a move that far south would seem as a retreating position to the enemy which they would take advantage of.  But the term “if practicable” still swirled around the head of Ewell and Culp’s Hill lay in the hands of the Union.  Ewell’s reasoning behind not attacking Culp’s Hill on the first day of battle was that most of his men were scattered through the town forcing the Federals back and as Lee had not wanted a general engagement, he abandoned the idea.  Ewell would say, “I could not bring artillery to bear on it, and all the troops with me were jaded by twelve hours’ marching and fighting, and I was notified that General Johnson’s division (the only one of my corps that had not been engaged) was close to the town.”[3]  Cautious as he may have been and due to the lack of troops, there were many commanders willing to aid in the capturing of the hill.
              The terms “if practicable” ruined the Confederacy at Gettysburg and may have well ruined them for the whole war.  Ewell’s confusion on the subject caused engagements on that hill both the second and third day of battle, which resulted in many violent actions and encounters.  General Issac Trimble, though part of the Third Corps, was at Ewell’s side for the first day of battle, experienced the inability of command on Ewell’s part:  “Trimble’s close association with Ewell ended after a stormy meeting in the late afternoon…[he] buzzed excitetdly, ‘General, don’t you intend to pursue our sweep and push the enemy vigorously?’…Ewell only paced about, cited Lee’s order not to bring on a general engagement, and looked confused.”[4]  Trimble then began to argue with the commander asking for a division to take the hill which Ewell declined.  He then asked for a brigade which Ewell also declined and in one last fit of energy, he asked for a regiment but Ewell snapped back.  “‘When I need advice from a junior officer I generally ask for it.’ Trimble warned Ewell that he would regret not following his suggestions for as long as he lived, threw down his sword, and stormed off, saying he would no longer serve under such an officer.”[5]  With the opportunity open, Ewell was concerned about the execution of his own orders; if he underestimated the Union’s force, he would pay for it greatly with many lives and failure.  But any officer, or any soldier for that matter, could see the enemy was badly damaged on the first day’s fight:  “At that time no fresh Federal forces had arrived to support troops so shattered that even the famous Iron Brigade, which had started the day happily against Archer, was never again to be effective as a unit.”[6]  It seemed as though it was general knowledge the Union forces were weak at the time with no sign of reinforcements and still Ewell held back.  In his report he does state the Union army showed a good fight while occupying Cemetery Hill: “The enemy had fallen back to a commanding position known as Cemetery Hill, south of Gettysburg, and quickly showed a formidable front there.”[7]  His own account of the late afternoon and early evening of the 1st show no signs of the argument with Trimble nor does he mention the struggle with himself against the practicality of Culp’s Hill but conducted some scouting, nonetheless, before reporting to General Lee:  “I represented to the commanding general that the hill above referred to was unoccupied by the enemy, as reported by Lieutenants Turner and Early, who had gone upon it, and that it commanded their position and made it untenable so far as I could judge.”[8]  Upon that judgment, Lee allowed him to remain in his position and await orders.  Many officers serving under Ewell would regret the day they did not take the hill as the Union was heard digging in that night.
              Longstreet wanted to hold an attack, if not attack at all:  “Longstreet wasted little time before restating his ‘views against making an attack.’…in Longstreet’s words ‘make a reconnaissance of the ground in his front, with a view of making the main attack on his left.’”[9]  It would be in the Confederacy’s best interest that Big Round Top be taken for the high ground.  That was, of course, if General Lee saw it as well.  He had proposed the plan to take his corps to the south of the line and to attack Little Round Top while holding the larger hill; Lee took the plan into consideration and asked for opinions around command.  The two commanders also noted that a southern movement that drastic could be seen as a retreating motion to which Lee was against.  Attempting to find a plan that would completely work was difficult, however, and the two generals could not find a solid agreement to stand on.  “He [Lee] gave Longstreet an outright order to place McLaw’s and Hood’s divisions on the right of Hill ‘partially enveloping the enemy’s left, which he was to drive in.’”[10]  Longstreet, knowing that McLaw’s division was not fully present on the field at approximately 11:00 a.m., asked for a delay in attack which was granted by Lee.  This was all, of course, before Sickles collapsed the Union line with his infamous salient.  As Longstreet’s corps began their movements towards the positions for attack, many of the men seemed confused by what was going on; Longstreet himself riding far from the center of attention behind Hood. 
[1] Ibid, Pg. 203.
[2] Fremantle, Lt. Col. Arthur J. L.  “Three Months in the Southern States: April – June, 1863.” Pg. 237.
[3] Ewell, Richard.  “Official Records of the War of the Rebellion, Union and Confederate Armies.  Series I. Volume 27, Part II.”  Pg. 445.
[4] Tagg, Larry.  “The Generals at Gettysburg.” Pg. 329.
[5] Ibid.  329.
[6] Dowdey, Clifford.  “Death of a Nation.”  Pg. 145.
[7] Ewell, Richard.  “Official Records of the War of the Rebellion, Union and Confederate Armies.  Series I. Volume 27, Part II.”  Pg. 445.
[8] Ibid.  Pg. 446.
[9] Trudeau, Noah Andre.  “Gettysburg: A Testing of Courage.”  Pg. 279.
[10] Coddington, Edwin, B.  “The Gettysburg Campaign: A Study in Command.”  Pg. 378.

Richard Ewell, commanding general of the Second Corps of the Army of Northern Virginia, had recently received command after the death of Thomas “Stonewall” Jackson.  It was an exciting time for him as he had been requested by Stonewall himself to take his place if he should die, yet the situation in front of him was filled with confusion.  A mounted courier approached him with a short order from General Lee: “Take the hill to the southeast of the town if practicable.”  Those two words confused Ewell.  The Federal force was being pushed back through the town and his boys were at the forefront of the action.  To the north, General Gordon was forcing Barlow and his men into the town and to the northeast, where the Federals had gained much in the first few hours of battle, Daniel’s men were doing the same thing.  It was a proud moment for him; his position would improve in the eyes of General Lee for what he had done this day.  But in the eyes of his irreplaceable second in command, Longstreet, how would it seem?  General Longstreet, commanding general of the First Corps, arrived early in the afternoon, and voiced his opinion that Gettysburg may not have been the right place to fight.  As the Confederates fought through the town, the real tactic began to show itself and the entire Union army began to pour in.  Before this would be over, ninety-thousand men dressed in blue would face off against seventy-five thousand men in gray.  The advantage would be that the Union would hold the interior lines and at a greater strength.  Longstreet, knowing this, constantly reminded his commanders but he was often overruled and people with less experience were listened to.  As the battle came to a close, the reports from leaders started to pour in and the blame was handed out in the form of Longstreet and Stuart.  Due to his god-like stature, General Lee is far from blame and Stuart’s late arrival is hard to ignore.  History often forgets one of the largest failures of the entire campaign, which resided in the hill southeast of the town: Culp’s Hill.
              Though the order from Lee to Ewell concerning Culp’s Hill is not in writing, it does appear in Lee’s report of the battle:  “General Ewell was therefore instructed to carry the hill occupied by the enemy if he found it practicable, but to avoid a general engagement until the arrival of the other divisions of the army which were ordered to hasten forward.”[1]  Taking that order too seriously may have foreshadowed the Confederate defeat at the onset of the battle.  Many historians have stipulated whether or not Lee’s fight was set to be a failure from the beginning due to his numbers.  With the Union army at an approximate strength of ninety-thousand men and the Confederate force sitting at seventy-five thousand, the idea of a surrounding strategy did not look well on paper.  The first day’s fight was a struggle for the town but what was not seen was the exterior lines Lee would be forced to take south of the town.  As the Union fishhook[2] was created and placed in effect, the battle seemed to play out immediately in favor of the Union.  Longstreet noticed this right away on the morning of the second.  “As soon as it was light enough to see, however, the enemy was found in position on his formidable heights awaiting us.”[3]  He clearly noticed even though they had taken the town the previous day, all of the heights south had been taken by the Federals with their position dug in overnight.  Not only had Culp’s Hill been taken, which Ewell had failed to attack on July 1st, East Cemetery Hill, Cemetery Ridge and Little Round Top were already in Union hands.  On Culp’s Hill the Federal line was held by Slocum’s Twelfth Corps of just under ten thousand men; accompanying them was Wadsworth’s shattered division which was heavily engaged on the morning of the 1st.[4]  To the south of the fishhook was the Fifth Corps holding Little Round Top with fourteen thousand men.  So with the Union’s strong position, how would Lee’s force act against this?  His own information was hindered because General J.E.B. Stuart had failed to retrieve information about the enemy’s position; in fact he was missing altogether.  Lee would have to depend on cartographers and spies for his information which would cost him dearly: “Lee had wanted an early attack, but it was 11:00 a.m. before his order were issued…he moved on strange ground, his lead units taking heavy casualties from the sharpshooters of the Third Corps.”[5] 
              So why was Richard Ewell cautious of moving against the Federal position at Culp’s Hill?  It was not as if he was a poor commander while under Jackson:  “Ewell proved to be a skillful and successful division commander, and unlike Ambrose P. Hill and others, he was able to get along with Stonewall Jackson.”[6]  What was interesting about Ewell is not his commanding abilities, but his eccentricities,  “…he had a lisp that gave an added dimension to his pungent comments and to the blistering profanity he used when irritated.”[7]  Placing aside any of his traits, personal and emotional, many men admired him for his closeness with Jackson and not because of his command abilities:
               “Dick Ewell inspired men in spite of, not because of, his appearance…he had a fringe of brown hair on an otherwise bald and bomb-shaped head.  Bright bulging eyes protrude above a prominent nose, creating an effect which many likened to a bird – an eagle, some said, or a woodcock – especially when he left his head droop toward one shoulder, as he often did, and uttered strange speeches in his shrill, twittering lisp.”[8]
               Officers from Jackson’s staff stayed on, including the irreplaceable Sandy Pendleton.  But what some of his subalterns began to wonder was whether or not he had the fury of Jackson, something that would not be seen on the fields of Gettysburg.
[1] Lee, Robert E.  “The Wartime Papers of Robert E. Lee.” Pg. 576.
[2] See Appendix A.
[3] Longstreet, James.  “From Manassas to Appomattox.”  Pg. 363.
[4] See Appendix A.
[5] West Point Atlas of the Civil War.  Pg. 84.
[6] Phanz, Harry.  “Culp’s and Cemetery Hill.” Pg. 2.
[7] Ibid.  2.
[8] Tagg, Larry.  “The Generals of Gettysburg.”  Pg. 251.