Part 1
Joseph Hooker, commander of the Army of the Potomac in June of 1863, sat at his desk under a damp tent scrawling out his resignation to the General-in-Chief. He pondered his administration’s achievements and failures and came to a realization that one greatly outweighed the other. His work with spy networking supplied the capitol with more information than any other commander; the network worked with a very low capture rate. He had re-organized the cavalry into their own corps and used them to his advantage in reconnaissance while using some of the cavalry in the spy network. And he had also spent a great amount of time training the troops in drills that they were unfamiliar in, especially in the display of the Battle of Fredericksburg. But as he saw there thinking of all the good, the failure weighed upon his head: Chancellorsville. Henry Halleck was not a forgiving man, and neither would you want that in a leader organizing a whole army, but he had been harassing Hooker long enough that it pushed him to resignation. As he signed his letter, he seemed bothered by Lincoln’s inaction between the two allowing Hooker and Halleck to butt each other’s heads off like dogs on this damp day. Hooker’s aide approached the tent, saluted the general, and handed him a message. With a heavy heart, fearing a harassing message from the high command, he opened it to find a report from General Buford and his position in Pennsylvania. Hoping to end his tenure as commander on a high note, he added the information provided to him in his resignation, folded it and gave it to his aide. Along with the note were strict orders to forward it to the war department immediately. All he had to do now was wait for his replacement and hope Buford would find something in Pennsylvania.
Ever since the engagement at Brandy Station in Culpepper County, Virginia, Hooker was absolute in his assumption that General Lee was making his way toward the north. “Prisoners and deserters brought in here state that Stuart is preparing a column of from 15,000 to 20,000 men, cavalry and artillery, for a raid. They say it will be ready in two or three days.”[1] Upon hearing this news, the high command especially the President, was both excited and wary of the news. “…in case you find Lee coming to the north of the Rappahannock, I would by no means cross to the south of it…If Lee would come to my side of the river, I would keep on the same side…But these are mere suggestions, which I desire to be controlled by the judgment of yourself and General Halleck.”[2] Halleck, in agreement with Lincoln, writes to Hooker stating more in depth matters of defense of Washington and Harper’s Ferry. There was a concern that Lee would be moving towards Pennsylvania and Maryland, but it was nothing compared to the concern of Washington’s defense. “Neither this capital nor Harper’s Ferry could long hold on against a large force…Lee will probably move light and rapidly. You movable force should be prepared to do the same.”[3] As these reports flowed in and out of the war department, there was very little worry that the Confederates would find their way into Pennsylvania. As Lee and the Army of Northern Virginia found their way into Maryland the previous year and failed, the worry was very thin. The raid near Culpepper country was coming soon and Hooker used his cavalry as a reconnaissance to ascertain the reason for the raid. What they found was nothing more than a review of J.E.B. Stuart’s corps.
[1] Hooker, Joseph. “Official Records of the War of the Rebellion Union and Confederate Armies. Series I, Volume 27, Part 1. Pg. 31.
[2] Ibid, Pg. 31.
[3] Ibid, Pg. 32.
Joseph Hooker, commander of the Army of the Potomac in June of 1863, sat at his desk under a damp tent scrawling out his resignation to the General-in-Chief. He pondered his administration’s achievements and failures and came to a realization that one greatly outweighed the other. His work with spy networking supplied the capitol with more information than any other commander; the network worked with a very low capture rate. He had re-organized the cavalry into their own corps and used them to his advantage in reconnaissance while using some of the cavalry in the spy network. And he had also spent a great amount of time training the troops in drills that they were unfamiliar in, especially in the display of the Battle of Fredericksburg. But as he saw there thinking of all the good, the failure weighed upon his head: Chancellorsville. Henry Halleck was not a forgiving man, and neither would you want that in a leader organizing a whole army, but he had been harassing Hooker long enough that it pushed him to resignation. As he signed his letter, he seemed bothered by Lincoln’s inaction between the two allowing Hooker and Halleck to butt each other’s heads off like dogs on this damp day. Hooker’s aide approached the tent, saluted the general, and handed him a message. With a heavy heart, fearing a harassing message from the high command, he opened it to find a report from General Buford and his position in Pennsylvania. Hoping to end his tenure as commander on a high note, he added the information provided to him in his resignation, folded it and gave it to his aide. Along with the note were strict orders to forward it to the war department immediately. All he had to do now was wait for his replacement and hope Buford would find something in Pennsylvania.
Ever since the engagement at Brandy Station in Culpepper County, Virginia, Hooker was absolute in his assumption that General Lee was making his way toward the north. “Prisoners and deserters brought in here state that Stuart is preparing a column of from 15,000 to 20,000 men, cavalry and artillery, for a raid. They say it will be ready in two or three days.”[1] Upon hearing this news, the high command especially the President, was both excited and wary of the news. “…in case you find Lee coming to the north of the Rappahannock, I would by no means cross to the south of it…If Lee would come to my side of the river, I would keep on the same side…But these are mere suggestions, which I desire to be controlled by the judgment of yourself and General Halleck.”[2] Halleck, in agreement with Lincoln, writes to Hooker stating more in depth matters of defense of Washington and Harper’s Ferry. There was a concern that Lee would be moving towards Pennsylvania and Maryland, but it was nothing compared to the concern of Washington’s defense. “Neither this capital nor Harper’s Ferry could long hold on against a large force…Lee will probably move light and rapidly. You movable force should be prepared to do the same.”[3] As these reports flowed in and out of the war department, there was very little worry that the Confederates would find their way into Pennsylvania. As Lee and the Army of Northern Virginia found their way into Maryland the previous year and failed, the worry was very thin. The raid near Culpepper country was coming soon and Hooker used his cavalry as a reconnaissance to ascertain the reason for the raid. What they found was nothing more than a review of J.E.B. Stuart’s corps.
[1] Hooker, Joseph. “Official Records of the War of the Rebellion Union and Confederate Armies. Series I, Volume 27, Part 1. Pg. 31.
[2] Ibid, Pg. 31.
[3] Ibid, Pg. 32.
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